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INTRODUCTION
The future of organizing: should we return to the policy of the Wagner
Act? This question, as part of a consideration of the future of labor unions
in the twenty-first century, compels one to focus on a crucial premise: that
the Wagner Act was helpful to unions in the middle part of the twentieth
century. Moreover, most persons who would agree that the Wagner Act
was helpful to unions assume, without conscious examination, a related
premise: namely, that the Wagner Act was helpful to workers.
Examining these premises is essential. If the Wagner Act at its outset
did not provide a sound foundation for future growth of employee
representation, then it is most unlikely that any amount of tinkering with it
will provide a statutory vehicle suitable for the vastly changed economic
and working environment of the twenty-first century. No amount of labor
law reform can overcome a weak foundation.
GOALS OF THE WAGNER ACT
The overriding question is: what was the fundamental goal of the
Wagner Act? Bluntly speaking, what was the Wagner Act designed to
achieve? Much has been written about the turmoil of the early 1930s,
particularly the radical change that occurred in American politics with the
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election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the advent of the New Deal. What
clearly emerges is that employers were overwhelmingly opposed to
collective bargaining.' Workers, previously laboring in poor conditions,
found themselves in desperate straits as the Great Depression deepened.2
For the first time in America, significant numbers of workers in different
parts of the nation engaged in industrial conflict in an attempt to improve
their terms and conditions of work.3 Congress intervened in this labor
conflict for the first time, as the widespread social unrest came to be seen
as a national problem.4 In contrast to its policy set forth only three years
earlier in the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' Congress enacted a statute that gave
1. Several studies focused on tactics used by employers to defeat union organizing
efforts. The most complete, contemporaneous study was conducted by the La Follette
Committee. In June 1936, Congress directed an investigation of antiunion tactics to be
undertaken by the Committee on Education and Labor chaired by Senator Robert La Follette
of Wisconsin. S. Res. 266, 74th Cong. The La Follette Committee conducted 58 days of
hearings, and published fourteen volumes of testimony. The committee later published a
series of summary documents by topic. An example is the frequently cited Report on
Industrial Espionage, Report No. 46, 75th Congress (1937), which described employers' use
of undercover agents, such as those supplied by Pinkerton's, inside the plant to identify pro-
union employees who would then be fired.
Why Americans employers were so opposed to unionization and why they continue to
be so is another question. For a discussion, see Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Law, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1394, 1409-1411 (1971).
2. In 1933, 24.9 percent of the civilian labor force was unemployed. COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 316, table B-35 (2001). Since
1941, the unemployment rate in the United States has never exceeded 10 percent. Id. It is
difficult to capture the impact of the Depression on average working persons from statistics.
For a leading historian's account, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963). Chapter 6, One Third of a Nation, is particularly
effective in describing the financial impact and emotional pain of widespread, long-lasting
unemployment. Id. at 118-142.
3. For a general discussion of union activity (such as strikes) and of union membership
figures, see HARRY A. MILLIS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR (1945).
4. In his first presidential campaign, President Roosevelt had promised a New Deal,
and had also promised immediate action to attack the economic and financial crisis facing
the country. In his campaign, Roosevelt sought to depict the incumbent president, Herbert
Hoover, as a person doing nothing in the face of a severe crisis, one in which banks were
failing and the unemployment rate was climbing to the highest ever experienced. The main
idea underlying the recovery plan was that the deflationary cycle could only be halted by
increasing the purchasing power of people, which in turn meant taking action to keep people
in jobs (rather than being laid off) and at wage rates which at least remained stable (rather
than falling). Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act during the first 100
days of Roosevelt's administration. Most of the provisions of this statute relate to erecting a
system whereby industry groups would regulate the production and prices for a given
industry, and would execute a "code." One section, however, dealt with labor matters.
Section 7(a) stated that employees have the right to organize and bargain collectively.
5. In the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994), Congress limited
the federal courts' ability to issue injunctions in cases involving or growing out of a labor
dispute. The act can be-and was at the time-seen as an improvement, because federal
courts were no longer interfering in labor disputes. See BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED
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employees certain rights and established a federal institution to implement
and enforce the statute.6
Some view the Wagner Act as a radical piece of social legislation
designed to guarantee democracy in the workplace. 7 As the notion of
industrial democracy was a rallying cry of leftists in Europe in the 1920s,8
it may have been that some members of Congress saw the Wagner Act as
the basis for a transformation of American society.9 In fact, the media
quoted Senator Wagner himself as propounding the view that those
WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 78-85 (5th ed. 1987). Many states, especially in the
industrialized northeast and Midwest, copied the federal statute and enacted "baby Norris-
LaGuardia" acts. A study in the 1960s found that 25 states had such a statute. U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, GROWTH OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 207 (1967). Notwithstanding
this conception of the Noris-LaGuardia Act, Congress's action created no employee rights,
and removed an existing legal forum for dispute resolution. Professor Gorman succinctly
notes that while the Norris-LaGuardia Act sheltered peaceful strikes, picketing and boycotts
against federal injunctions, it did not "shelter employees engaged in such concerted
activities against employer self-help measures such as replacement or outright discharge."
ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 296 (1976). The result was that labor and
management were thrust into industrial combat with the final result dictated by economic
power. Id. It is not surprising that the number of disputes increased and that many were
long and bitter. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 2, at 95-117 (describing the more radical,
conflictual spirit evident in 1934). Leuchtenburg notes: "In 1934, a series of violent strikes,
many of them led by avowed radicals, shook the country." Id. at 111. He then details
numerous, large strikes ranging from farm workers in California to taxicab drivers in New
York City, many of which were violent. Id. at 111-114.
6. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). Although
Congress enacted two separate statutes in the period from 1934 to 1935, the statutes can be
viewed together as a single response to the wave of industrial disputes. In the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 246 Stat. 375, repealed by Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Exec. Order No. 7252 (Dec. 21, 1935); Exec. Order No.
7323 (Mar. 26, 1936), Congress provided employees with the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and gave the National Labor Relations Board power to order elections and hear
complaints. But the statute failed to specify patterns of antiunion conduct, and failed to
provide the Board with enforcement power. The flaws in the NIRA were glaringly obvious.
See JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 1933-1937
23-39, 122-130 (1974). The statute's sudden and early demise proved fortunate to
organized labor. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 495 (1935), the
Supreme Court held that the entire NIRA was unconstitutional. This captured the attention
of Congress. There was an immediate need to re-enact the employee rights enumerated in
section 7(a) of the NIRA so that workers would not lose those that they previously had.
Moreover, now there was an opportunity to re-enact those rights in a much better designed
statute. Congress did so in one month.
7. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935) (statement of Senator Wagner) (expressing a
broader social vision with references to workers "dwarfed by the size of corporate
enterprise," and the need for cooperation among such workers so they can attain "freedom
and dignity").
8. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE
AGE (1998) (discussing the movement of social ideas from the European side of the Atlantic
to the American in the period 1870-1940).
9. 79 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
2002]
4 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 5:1
accustomed to industrial democracy would be stalwarts of freedom and
democracy in the political sphere. ° Although some individual legislators
may have seen the Wagner Act in this light, it is difficult to find evidence
that Congress had such a broad vision when enacting the Wagner Act.
There is no statement in the legislative history to this effect." Virtually
nothing was said in committee or on the floor of Congress about collective
bargaining being a basis for democratic participation.12 Rather, supporters
of the statute repeatedly emphasized that by requiring employers and
workers to bargain over issues such as wages and hours, their differences
often would be resolved, and thus the likelihood that workers would resort
to strikes and other economic weapons would be greatly reduced. 3
Because section 7 of the Wagner Act is the foundation of employee
representation rights, one might think that the statute was designed to inject
modes of employee representation into the workplace. Once again, there is
no evidence in the legislative history to support this view. Moreover, there
appears to be nothing in contemporaneous media accounts that suggests
that any member of Congress had a glimpse of employee representation
models other than unions. Some advisors to Congressional labor
proponents were aware of developments such as the first works council
legislation in Germany in 1920.14 Yet, there is no expression of any intent
to give workers who were not affiliated with unions any vehicle for
workplace representation. 15
It is evident from all contemporary accounts that Congress was
10. See Robert F. Wagner, The Ideal Industrial State, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 9,
1937 at 23 ("But let men know the dignity of freedom and self-expression in their daily
lives, and they will never bow to tyranny in any quarter of their national life").
11. See 79 CONG. REC. 7565-74 (1935).
12. See id. (notwithstanding Senator Wagner's comments, discussing the principle of
majority rule for purposes of representation as "the best protection of workers' rights, just as
it is the surest guaranty of political liberty").
13. Id. at7565-73.
14. See Manfred Weiss, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the Federal Republic of
Germany 149-150 (1989).
15. At the time the German legislation was enacted, it was seen as a victory for
employers because it was thought that plant-based works councils would satisfy the desire
of employees for some modicum of employee participation and would undercut the ability
of socialist unions to organize these workers. Id. at 150. Professor Weiss states that "the
law of 1920 more closely resembled the models established by employers in the 19th
century than it did the ideas developed by the unions." He further comments that the law of
1920 was enacted "in spite of the unions and not because of them." This view proved to be
correct. WEISS, supra note 14, at 149-150. The 1920 Works Constitution Act covered both
the public and private sector. After World War II, the situation changed. The 1952 Works
Constitution Act, amended in 1972, covers the private sector only. The 1955 Federal Staff
Representation Act, amended in 1974, covers the public sector. For a general discussion,
see Johannes Schregle, Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: a
comparative view, 117 INT'L L. REv. 81 (1978).
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responding pragmatically to an existing situation, one where unions were
battling to be recognized by employers and to be engaged in collective
bargaining over terms of employment. Congress focused on the specific
problems facing unions; most notably, the legal barriers that made it
extremely difficult in practice for unions to organize in the face of
employer opposition.' 6  Simply put, the laws of property, contracts and
torts, as applied to an organizing situation, assisted the employer. If
workers were to go on strike, they were considered to have breached their
employment contracts.' 7 If a union organizer persuaded workers to stop
working, the organizer was deemed to have committed a tort (inducing a
18breach of contract). Work stoppages and picketing activities resulted in
an economic loss to the employer could be viewed as interfering with the
employer's property rights.19 Even activities in which one person could
lawfully engage, such as negotiating for a higher wage, could be deemed an
unlawful conspiracy if several workers banded together for the same
purpose.20 Employers did not sue for damages, partly because workers had
16. Several legal doctrines had the effect of making the union's acts unlawful when
applied to situations of industrial conflict. Typically, employers went into court and sought
an order restraining the union from engaging in the industrial action, such as a strike,
picketing or a boycott. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930) (definitive study on the use of the injunction in labor disputes, and on the
strategic reasons why employers sought injunctive relief). See also EDWIN E. WITrE, THE
GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932).
17. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1918), the Court held that
the union attempted to "subvert the system of employment at the mine by coverted breaches
of the contract of employment known to be in force there."
18. This was possible where the employer had required workers, as a condition of
employment, to agree not to join a union. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229, 250-51 (1918), the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the "yellow dog"
contract. Employers recognized that employees, having agreed to such a clause, would be
fearful that if they supported a union, they would breach their own contract. In UMW v. Red
Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839, 849 (4th Cir. 1927), the court held that
it was unlawful for union organizers to approach employees working under such contracts
for the purpose of inducing them to join the union and to go on strike in order to compel the
company to recognize the union.
19. American courts took a more expansive view of what constituted property rights
than did British courts. Intangible items, such as the right to do business, were deemed
property rights. For a discussion, see CHARLES 0. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 97
(1946).
20. By the 1930s, these would have been brought as civil, not criminal, suits. It is
generally accepted that the first recorded case involving what today would be called labor
activity was the Philadelphia Cordwainers' case, Commonwealth v. Pullis, (Philadelphia
Mayor's Court, 1806). The case is reported in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59-248 (John R. Commons et al. eds., 1910). In Pullis, the court held
that ". . . a combination of workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a twofold
point of view: one is to benefit themselves ... the other is to injure those who do not join
their society. The rule of law condemns both." The Cordwainers' decision was influential.
Between 1806 and 1842, there were 17 trials in which union members were charged with
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inadequate savings to cover such damages.2 Rather, they sought injunctive
relief, because their main goal was to break the union, and to get people
22back to work as quickly as possible. In a recognition dispute, employers
were able to draw on existing common law as a source of useful rights,
whereas unions found themselves in a weaker legal position. The
legislative history of the Wagner Act makes it abundantly clear that
Congress was responding to specific situations where this legal deficit
made it extremely difficult for unions to organize, to compel employer
recognition, or to engage in collective bargaining.23
criminal conspiracy. See Edward E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L. J.
825, 827 (1926). In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111
(1842), the Massachusetts court held that labor unions, per se, were not unlawful
associations, although a lawful organization could be found to have pursued unlawful
objectives. This case marked the shift from criminal to civil prosecution of labor cases. For
a general discussion, see Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825
(1926). At the time of the Wagner Act's passage, Congress responded to the legal
vulnerability of collective activity as opposed to individual action. ROBERT A. GORMAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 2 (1976). There was not thought to be a need to protect
individual action because the courts had seized on the fact that two or more persons acted in
concert to do something that would have been lawful if one person did it. It is ironic that
years later, individual action was deemed to need explicit protection in light of judicial
decisions. See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the
Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
286, 329 (1981).
21. One famous case, Danbury Hatters, illustrates this. In the first case that went to the
Supreme Court, Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), the Court held that the Sherman
Antitrust Act could be used against labor unions. The hat makers' union, with 9000
members, had organized a boycott of nonunion company's products. The company claimed
that in one year it had suffered a loss of $85,000 from the boycott of its hats. In January
1915, damages of $252,000 were awarded, with the individual union members held liable
for the payment of the damages. Loewe v. Lawlor, 235 U.S. 522 (1915). The award
crippled the union and was a severe blow to the low paid union members. To avert financial
disaster for the workers, the American Federation of Labor raised the funds necessary. See
Daniel R. Ernst, The Danbury Hatters' Case, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 180-200
(Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992). What is interesting is that in the
suit to recover damages, 248 defendants were listed. The plaintiff's attorney had combed
real estate and banking records to determine which of the union's 2000 Connecticut
members had homes or bank accounts, and only 248 had assets which he could attach.
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 93 n.
131 (1991).
22. See I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 7 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992). The use of
the labor injunction to undermine union activity was decried in a study of injunctions issued
by both federal and state courts, a study widely cited in the period preceding the enactment
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See FELIX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930). A more recent historical study reviews cases prior to 1930 and likewise
concludes that anti-strike decrees were commonplace. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, supra
note 21, at 59-97, 193-198.
23. See generally Leon Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current
Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960). Keyserling is widely recognized as the
draftsman of the Wagner Act. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came to
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The main goal of the Wagner Act was to assist unions in their
organizing efforts by according workers certain statutory rights designed to
counterbalance the employer's common law rights. The ultimate
objectives of Congress are unclear,24 and in any event, unimportant, since
no subsequent legislation has expanded upon the rights granted in section
7.25 If this was the policy of the Wagner Act, the question today is whether
the policy is still relevant. To answer this requires a two-part
consideration: first, whether the unions still face legal barriers in
organizing; and second, whether statutory devices designed for the
industrial relations environment of the 1930s are still relevant today.
The first question, whether unions still face legal barriers in
organizing, can be answered quickly and definitively with a resounding
yes. If section 7 of the Wagner Act were repealed, unions would be thrust
back into the common law regime existing in the 1920s. The common law
doctrines of property, contract, and tort law used by employers' lawyers
have never been repudiated by the courts. They are not applied today for
26the simple reason that statutory rights have taken precedence over them.
In the absence of the protections provided by section 7, however, twenty-
first century courts would apply existing common law doctrines.
Be: A Prospectus, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2201, 2205 (1998).
24. The preamble to the statute makes economic stability an important objective. 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1994). Support for the Wagner Act can also be traced to the acceptance of the
under-consumption view of the Great Depression. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936). The analysis put forward by
Keynesian macroeconomics explains that the Depression was caused by insufficient
aggregate demand because of a failure of consumer purchasing power to keep pace with the
growing productive capacity of America's mass production industries. Those taking this
view believed that if workers organized, they would be able to secure higher wages, which
in turn give them greater purchasing power. This view was expressed by company
spokesmen in Senate hearings on the Wagner Act. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN, HARRY C.
KATz & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 26 (1986). Undoubtedly, the economic crisis of the 1930s made this goal
important, but it was not mentioned in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA, Taft-Hartley Act), U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1994), or the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure of 1959 (LMRDA, Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et
seq. (1990).
25. An expansion or refinement of section 7 rights in light of subsequent developments
might have indicated that some unstated Congressional objective had not been attained. An
example would be a requirement that employees receive information on and be consulted
regarding firm investment decisions that may affect them. For a discussion, see Janice R.
Bellace, Mandatory Consultation: The Untravelled Road in American Labor Law, Proceedings
of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, Chicago, Illinois,
Dec. 1987, pp. 78-83.
26. Some scholars have argued, however, that very strong notions of employer property
rights influence how the courts interpret section 7 rights, thus diluting what would seem to
be robust employee rights to organize. See, e.g., James Atleson, Confronting Judicial
Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in a Common Law System, 45 BUFFALO L. REv. 435
(1997).
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Not only would unions still confront legal barriers to organizing if
section 7 were repealed, but the even more distressing fact is that the
accretion of 65 years' of case law has not significantly strengthened the
section 7 rights related to organizing. Unions still face substantial
problems when organizing due to legal weaknesses. Numerous scholarly
works and reports have documented these problems, so there is no need to
27detail them here. One example related to a critical aspect of organizing
will suffice. Consider the ways in which workers might organize. One
possibility is that an unorganized group of workers, on its own,
spontaneously decides to form a union. A second possibility is that a few
workers become frustrated with the terms and conditions at work and
contact a union to see if the union can assist them. A third possibility is
that a union realizes that a certain workplace is not organized, and the
union, as part of its strategy to organize workers in its industry or craft,
targets that workplace. Anyone who speaks with the organizing
departments of unions knows that the first possibility almost never occurs.
The second and third possibilities both occur, with the incidence of the
third possibility related to the resources the union devotes to organizing.
Whether a given unorganized workplace presents itself as a target for
organizing through opportunistic, unplanned information or through
systematic planning, one factor immediately arises. The union must make
contact with employees at that workplace. At the initial stage, a union
organizer who does not work at the unorganized workplace must make
contact with the workers there. If there is no successful communication,
there is no chance the union will be able to organize.28 The union
organizers must then persuade the workers to be interested in, and
ultimately vote for a union. 29  The union's ability to get in front of
employees and present its message is the key to success. If the union
cannot do this, it cannot win; if the union is seriously hampered in its
ability to do this, it will find it difficult to win.3°
It is clear to employers that contact and communication are critical to
union success.3' Various tactics, including no-solicitation policies, are used
27. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1776-1803 (1983) (arguing that the
current NLRB certification procedure does not effectively insulate employees from the
types of antiunion employer tactics that the NLRA was supposed to eliminate).
28. See David Dial, Reversal of NLRB Policy Regarding No-Solicitation Rules, 34
BAYLOR L. REv. 143 (1982) ("Throughout the union movement, one of the most effective
strategies used by employers to thwart employees' efforts to unionize has been the
promulgation of no-solicitation rules.").
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. For a discussion of the effect of specific union organizing communication
techniques, see Hoyt N. Wheeler & John A. McClendon, The Individual Decision to
Unionize, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 47-79, 66 (George Strauss, Daniel G. Gallagher &
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32
to keep workers away from union organizers.
In 1935, Congress was well aware of the difficulties union organizers
faced.33  Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") was
designed to overcome this. The NLRA gave employees the right to form,
join and assist unions.34  Congress realized that some employers literally
threw the non-employee union organizer out of town,35 and, therefore, it
defined "employee" broadly in the Wagner Act to cover "any employee. 36
This expanded definition has been interpreted to mean that non-employee
union organizers would have a right of access to unorganized workers, at
least to the extent that access occurs during non-working time and in areas
that do not interfere with the conduct of the business.37 With the increase
in union organizing activity following the passage of the Wagner Act,
employers began instituting no-solicitation policies.38 In 1945, in Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court considered for the first time
the impact of such a policy and upheld the NLRB's view that time outside
working hours is the employees' time to use as they wish even though the
employees are on company property.39 Yet, in 1956, in NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox, the Supreme Court denied union organizers of the only
reasonable, safe, straightforward access to employees. Seizing on the fact
Jack Fiorito eds., 1991).
32. See Pressures in Today's Workplace: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm.
on Education and Labor, 95th Cong. (1979) (statement of Robert A. Georgine, President of
the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO) (detailing some of the
different practices companies use to prevent union organizer communication with
employees).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
34. Id.
35. Such occurrences were more common in the 1920s as company towns and mining
towns were much more prevalent. See supra note 18 for prominent mining cases. The
appearance of a non-employee showing up in town and talking to workers would have been
immediately apparent to the company supervisors. That Congress was well aware of these
cases is clear from the fate that befell Judge Parker, the federal court of appeals judge who
wrote the majority opinion in the 1927 United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket
Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927). Three years later, Judge
Parker was nominated for a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court. Donald E. Lively, The
Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional Roles and
Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 567 (1986). On May 7, 1930, the Senate voted to
reject the nomination. The rejection of Judge Parker was front page news. See Senate
Rejects Judge Parker, 41 to 39; Spirited Attack by Johnson Precedes Final Vote on
Hoover's Choice for Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1930, p. 1. cols. 6-8.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
37. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Republic Aviation
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 804 (1945).
38. See Archibald Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy 13-14 (1960).
39. Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 804-805. The Supreme Court expressly
adopted the standard set forth by the NLRB in Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 843-44
(1943).
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that the organizers were not employees of the target employer, the Court
concluded that the employer's private property rights trumped the
employees' rights to discuss unionization.40 The Court held that the union
had reasonable alternatives for communicating with the employees without
any analysis whatsoever of how the union would identify who the
employees were, where they lived, what mode of initial contact would be
made, how much this would cost, and how much time it would take to
reach the employees. 41 There also was no balancing of the burden this
would place on the employees' self-organization rights versus the burden
placed on the employer's private property rights by having some non-
employee union organizers standing in the company-owned parking lot
next to the plant.42
Babcock & Wilcox is an extremely important case because it was the
harbinger of a string of cases where courts proceeded on the assumption
that the employer's private property rights were paramount.43
In these cases, the Court also assumed that the employees' right to
self-organization need only be met in some way, but certainly not fully
exercised in a cost-effective, time efficient, direct, non-disruptive way.44
Babcock & Wilcox is also an important case because the specific
factual situation reflects a major change in American society-the move
from the cities to the suburbs. In debating the Wagner Act, Congress had
in mind the prominent labor disputes of the day and the workers that unions
were trying to recruit for their organizations. 45  For the most part these
workers lived in cities or in company towns. They walked to work, or took
public transportation.46 Pickets in a labor dispute or union organizers
40. Babcock and Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 111-112.
41. Id. at 112.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992); NLRB v. Jones
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1937); NLRB v. Cities Servs. Oil Co., 122 F.2d
149, 150 (2d Cir. 1941); Arts Metal Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1940).
44. Babcock & Wilcox, as a judicial decision, can also be seen as representative of the
1950s, a conservative period in American history, and a period when Eisenhower appointees
to the NLRB and to the federal courts changed the direction of national labor policy. See
JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISES: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,
1947-1994 124 (1995). In his detailed analysis of this period, Professor James Gross
concludes: "[Miany of those statutorily guaranteed protections were withdrawn as employer
resistance to union organization was substantially deregulated and even protected while
ever-increasing restrictions were placed on union organizing techniques." Id. at 144-145.
45. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 190 (1978).
46. For instance, one survey of the hosiery industry showed most workers in
Philadelphia living within a two-mile radius of their jobs with practically all walking to
work. Other surveys of the era indicate the great majority of workers living less than a 40
minute walk from work. See WALTER LICHT, GETTING WORK: PHILADELPHIA, 1840-1950
51-55 (1992).
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typically stood outside the plant, on the publicly owned sidewalk. Twenty
years later, in Babcock & Wilcox, the plant was located on a 100-acre
fenced-in tract outside a town. 7 Only forty percent of the workers lived in
the town, with the majority living in a thirty-mile radius of the plant.
48
Ninety percent of the workers drove in private automobiles to work.49 The
only public property where the union organizers could stand was the
narrow strip of land between the end of the company's privately owned
parking lot driveway and the highway.5 ° Thus, Babcock & Wilcox can be
seen as the archetypal suburban plant. It is not surprising that since 1956
the battleground on the enforceability of no-solicitation rules has involved
similar sites, such as industrial parks and shopping centers. As industry
and commerce have moved increasingly to the suburbs, places where often
there is virtually no public property, union organizers have found
themselves like the union organizers of the 1920s, wondering how to make
51contact with workers in the company town that they can't get near.
The judicial philosophy underlying Babcock & Wilcox, that common
law private property rights prevail unless it can be shown that the
employees' statutory self-organization rights cannot be exercised in any
other way,52 continues to this day. Despite the Wagner Act's support for
employee self-organization, the courts have never found implicit in section
7 a worker's right to access information about unions. While recognizing
that the workers do need to be informed about unions, there is no indication
that the courts have ever considered innovative approaches to facilitating
communication that would avoid burdening the employer's private
property rights. For instance, a union is entitled to a list of the employees'
names and addresses once an election has been agreed upon or ordered.
3
In announcing this policy, the Board in Excelsior Underwear, Inc.54 took
the position that employees would be in a better position to make a fully
informed and reasoned choice on union representation if they heard
47. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 106.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 106-107.
50. Id.
51. In a situation where no person from the unorganized company has contacted the
union, the non-employee union organizer must identify some employees who may have
some pro-union disposition. Once the organizer has identified those persons, it may be
possible for form an in-plant organizing committee whose members are employees. Thus,
the harshest impact of the Babcock & Wilcox holding occurs when the union is attempting to
gain a foothold at a nonunion facility.
52. As a factual matter, research has shown that there is a significant imbalance
between employer and union opportunities for organizational communication and that this
has a direct effect on election outcomes. JULIUS G. GETMANN, JEAN GOLDBERG & JEANNE
HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 156-159 (1976).
53. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1966).
54. Id.
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arguments from both sides.55 Yet, one could argue that if employees heard
arguments from both sides at the initial steps in the representation process,
they would be in a better position to make a fully informed and reasoned
decision on whether to even sign a union authorization card. Under this
reasoning, the Board could establish a procedure that permitted a union
wanting to organize a facility to request the names and addresses of the
employees so it could mail them literature on union organization. The
employer, aware of the union's interest, could likewise communicate with
its employees on why they should not be interested in a union. This
suggestion will strike most readers as either absurd, or at a minimum,
wildly unlikely to be ever accepted by the courts. The reaction is telling,
for it reflects an understanding built up over half a century that, while
ostensibly balancing the employer's rights against the employees' rights,
the courts, in practice, balance a robust fully-formed notion of private
property rights against a weak, vaguely-realized notion of self-organization
rights.
Returning to the first question, whether the legal barriers unions face
today in organizing are still relevant, the answer is obvious. If section 7 of
the Wagner Act were repealed, unions would be thrust back into the
common law regime existing in the 1920s.5' This is evident from the fact
that even today the courts continue to rely on common law notions of
property rights to dilute the strength of employees' statutory rights.57
These common law rights have never been abolished. At present, the full
force of their application is restrained solely by the existence of the section
7 rights. As one commentator has observed about the situation in the
1950s, "[O]rganized labor was locked into a law that in important ways
was being used to defeat union organization for collective bargaining.,"
Unions continue to face the same dilemma. The law is being used against
them, but without that law their situation would be even more bleak than it
currently is with the law.5 9
55. Id. at 1240. The Supreme Court sustained the substantive validity of the Board
issued requirement in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969).
56. It is a matter of speculation on whether and how courts today would apply any
given common law doctrine to a labor relations fact situation. A switch from our statutory
labor law regime to one based on common law has been proposed; see Richard A. Epstein,
A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92
YALE L. J. 1357, 1357-58 (1983).
57. A prominent British scholar has argued that judges are trained in the common law,
and notions of property and contract law are so fundamental to them that they fail to grasp,
or find abhorrent, the startling ideology of labor law. Lord Wedderbum, Labour Law: From
Here to Autonomy?, 16 INDUS. L. J. 1, 4-7 (1987).
58. See GROSS, supra note 44, at 145.
59. The term "bleak" is used because unions represent only 9.0% of the private sector
labor force. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS IN
2000 1 (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. Including
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THE CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT
Over the past thirty years, much of the debate on labor law reform has
assumed that if the Wagner Act were interpreted and enforced for the
purpose originally intended, to encourage unionization, unions today would
represent a far larger percentage of the labor force. Buttressing this view is
survey evidence which reveals that many non-union employees are
60 61interested in representation, or at least in having influence at work. Yet,
there is much reason to be skeptical that a reinvigorated Wagner Act could
prove a vehicle for bringing representation to the masses. The major
problem is that the world for which the Wagner Act was designed has
ceased to exist.
The Wagner Act was designed to regulate labor relations in an
industrial economy, one that produced almost exclusively for a domestic
market. 6' The statute was designed for industrial workers, evident from the
fact that the act expressly excluded from its coverage agricultural laborers
and domestic servants,63 both employing very large numbers of workers ip
the 1930s. The examples used by members of Congress and the newspaper
accounts of the day also indicate that the picture Congress had in mind was
that of a male, blue-collar worker most often working in a factory.64 The
public sector workers, the total represented is 13.5%. Id. They need to organize a larger
proportion of the labor force, yet their ability to do so is hampered by the statute that only
gives legal protection to union organizing.
60. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999)
(providing a detailed examination of the desires of American workers). This book is based
on the findings of the 1994-95 Worker Representation Participation Study, a large-scale
survey conducted by academics.
61. See Larry W. Hunter, Considering What Workers Want, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
421 (2001) (discussing FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 60, and in particular considering
employees' predilection for unionization versus other forms of employee involvement).
62. In 1933, the United States had a civilian labor force of 51.59 million persons. Of
these, 10.09 million were employed in agriculture and 28.67 million were in non-
agricultural employment. By the end of the 20th century, the size of the civilian labor force
had increased 270 percent, but the number of persons in agricultural was less than one-third
the number in 1933. In 1999, when 139.37 million persons were in the civilian labor force,
only 3.28 million were employed in agriculture and 130.2 million were in non-agricultural
employment. (Note: data before 1947 defined the civilian labor force as persons over 14.
After 1947, the minimum age was raised to 16, and calculations were conducted
accordingly.) See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
316, table B-35 (2001).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
64. Accounts of the day virtually always discussed workers as "he." Even the focus on
the unemployed worker during the Depression was expressed as a problem of a man's
unemployment and the impact that had on him and his family. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG,
supra note 2, at 119 nn. 2-4 (listing contemporary accounts), for use of masculine pronouns.
See also Michael J. Piore, The Future of Unions, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 387-410, 402
(George Strauss, Daniel G. Gallagher & Jack Fiorito, eds., 1991) (noting that "the social
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mental picture Congress had of the typical worker and the typical
workplace influenced the process contemplated by the statute.
The Wagner Act assumes that for the most part, workers may well
have difficulty joining independent unions, and that employers will not
voluntarily recognize unions. The statute assumes that an employer will
not voluntarily engage in collective bargaining and that even if it does, the
union may need to engage in some form of industrial action in order to
compel the employer to sign a collective agreement. At the time, factories
and mines were managed along Taylorist lines.65 The demarcation between
workers and managers was very clear. Workers were not paid to think;
66
they were paid to follow orders given to them by their managers.
The Wagner Act is premised on an industrial relations model that
there are two classes in the industrial world, labor and management, and
that these two classes have very different, in fact opposing, interests. The
model for employee voice in this industrial relations environment is
representation through a union. The expression of that voice is assumed to
occur in an adversarial setting. Industrial combat is expected. The entire
statute rests upon the notion that to get anything employees will have to
structure in which modem trade unions developed was built upon an ideal in which the
household was represented in the labor market by a single, dominant (generally male) wage
earner" whom unions organized and represented; "the labor market commitment of women
was especially limited: they generally withdrew when they had their first child and reentered
only when the children began school or even later"). Piore points out that this general
pattern of withdrawal changed substantially in the 1980s.
65. In looking at managerial practices in the early 1900s, the academic literature
distinguishes between three approaches to managing workers in factories: the drive system,
scientific management (Taylor's approach), and the human relations movement. See HARRY
C. KATz & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 39-43 (1992). In the drive system, individual foremen and
supervisors were given substantial authority to hire, fire, and generally supervise labor as
they saw fit. Frederick Taylor promoted the scientific management approach based on
appropriate task designs (based on industrial engineering principles) and wage systems as
means of reducing conflict and increasing the efficiency of the production line. See, e.g.,
ROBERT HOXIE, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND LABOR (1915). Those who advocated the
human relations movement stressed that satisfied workers would work together in
cooperative work groups, and that these would achieve higher productivity. See, e.g.,
ELTON MAYO, A NEW APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1930). Both the scientific
management approach and the human relations approach agreed that to eliminate the
variations in personnel policies of the drive system, personnel functions had to be
centralized and supervisors had to be trained to apply the company policies.
66. For a discussion of American managerial practices, see MASTERS TO MANAGERS
(Sanford M. Jacoby ed., 1990). The three main approaches (the drive system, scientific
management, and human relations movement) all existed in the early 1930s, although they
tended not to co-exist in the same company. Ford Motor Company became known for
embracing scientific management, while the Bell Telephone Company followed the human
relations movement approach. See also SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY:
MANAGERS, UNIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-
1945 (1985).
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wrest it from the employer, and to force concessions employees might have
to strike. As a result, a great deal of attention was focused on the strike
weapon and no attention whatsoever was paid to supporting labor-
management cooperation.
THE DANGER OF RELYING ON STRIKE POWER
While the assumptions embedded in the Wagner Act can be justified
by the events of the era, problems with its internal logic should have been
apparent even then. The logic of the Wagner Act can be summarized, in
basic terms, as follows: if workers are able to organize into a union, then if
the employer is compelled to bargain with the union and the workers are
permitted to strike to wrest concessions from the employer, then eventually
a collective agreement will be signed that will improve the workers' terms
and conditions of employment. This sounds simplistic, but on close
examination there is nothing else in the Act. There was no need for more
because the statute had no grander goal. It was not attempting to transform
American unions which, unlike European unions, preferred to stick to
pragmatic "bread and butter" objectives and to rely on their own bargaining
67power. Neither was it attempting to transform American employers, or
trying to give workers any specific rights outside that of being able to
bargain. The Wagner Act was simply providing support for the process of
collective bargaining, in particular by buttressing the ability of workers to
organize themselves into a party capable of effective bargaining with the
employer.
Collective bargaining, however, does not in itself lead to continuing
agreements that provide the basis for long-term employer-union
coexistence. There must be bargaining power, which is nearly always
based on the ability to strike effectively, and no law can supply that. Even
68in 1935, it was evident that some workers had little or no strike power.
67. See RoY J. ADAMS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS UNDER LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: NORTH
AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 34-62 (1995) (discussing the orientation of
American unions). In chapter three, American Exceptionalism, Professor Adams
emphasizes that the American Federation of Labor rejected socialism and did not seek to
organize the entire labor force. Id. at 39. Rather, the AFL focused on collective bargaining,
not political reform, as the way to improve its members' lot. Id. at 43. Because of this
emphasis on simply improving the members' terms and conditions of employment, it has
sometimes been referred to as "pure and simple" unionism. Id. at 53. Although the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was emerging as an independent federation just
as the Wagner Act, the philosophy of the statute completely reflects the pragmatic
orientation of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Id. at 49.
68. Samuel Gompers, founding president of the American Federation of Labor and the
most prominent labor leader of his era, had been acutely aware that bargaining power rested
on strike power, and as such, the AFL unions focused on organizing craft workers since
these workers had skills which were difficult to replace. See generally SAMUEL GOMPERS,
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Although not widespread, there were already some examples of companies
moving from high wage areas to low wage areas in large measure to escape
the costs of unionization.69
SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR (1925; reprinted ed. 1967); FLORENCE C. THORNE,
SAMUEL GOMPERS-AMERICAN STATESMAN (1957). The labor economic theory explaining
this view was set forth in the classic book SELIG PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT (1928). The CIO unions recognized that semi-skilled and unskilled workers
could possess strike power if they joined together because by walking out they could shut
down a factory and the employer would find it difficult to find a sufficient number of
replacements in a short period of time. See ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE
UNIONS 17 (1962); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 2, at 111; LLOYD G. REYNOLDS, LABOR
ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 336-338 (5th ed. 1970); WALTER F. GALENSON, THE
CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL (1960). But even in the 1930s unions thought it difficult to
organize women workers, or those engaged in casual labor where companies went out each
day and hired the number of persons they needed. The noted labor economist, John Dunlop,
in 1948 articulated the traditional view: "One of the problems in organizing women arises
from the fact that they expect only a short working life and then plan to retire to the more
arduous duties of the household." John T. Dunlop, The Development of Labor
Organization: A Theoretical Framework, in RICHARD A. LESTER AND JOSEPH SHISTER,
INSIGHTS INTO LABOR ISSUES 84 (1948). The standard explanation focuses on labor force
attachment. It posits that American workers make a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis when
evaluating the utility of union membership. They appreciate that there will be a cost (e.g.,
from dues, lost earnings due to strikes) and they consider whether future higher wage rates
will outweigh the cost. If workers do not expect to remain with the same employer for very
long, the cost of union membership will be perceived to be more than the benefit.
Historically, women remained in a given company's employment for a shorter time than
men, typically because they would leave upon the birth of a child. Prior to civil rights
legislation, women's shorter job tenure and employer discriminatory practices also meant
that women were much less likely to receive job training that would enable them to transfer
to better paying jobs. Thus, they were less interested in a union's claim that it would
bargain about training and promotional opportunities. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE
ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN (1986). Chapter 4, Women's Place in the Labor Market,
discusses various factors that explain the wage gap between men and women. Id. at 62-86.
She points out that "whether a person had taken time away from employment did have an
appreciable effect on the wages a person (whether a man or woman) got when they
returned." Id. at 79. A study with a sample size of over 5000 done in the 1970s found that
on average, women had taken 5.8 years away from paid work. Only some men had been
away from work, and the men's absences averaged only half a year. Mary Corcoran &
Gregory J. Duncan, Work History, Labor-Force Attachment, and Earnings Differences
Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (1979). While the standard
economic explanation may identify the reason why women were difficult to organize, it
cannot be denied that many unions were uninterested in recruiting women members,
sometimes because male members thought that women would undercut the wage rates and
opposed their membership. Women were hardly likely to embrace unions that were hostile
to them. For a discussion of female union membership prior to 1950, see Philip S. Foner,
Women and the American Labor Movement: A Historical Perspective, in WORKING WOMEN:
PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 154-186 (Karen Shallcross Koziara, Michael H. Moskow &
Lucretia Dewey Tanner, eds., 1987).
69. The most prominent example is the textile industry. In the 1920s, textile mills shut
down in the North, especially Massachusetts, as the companies moved to the nonunion, low
wage South. See ALICE GALENSON, THE MIGRATION OF THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY
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Perhaps Congress was pragmatic about the limits of the law, as
evidenced by one egregious omission in the statute: permissible employer
treatment of striking workers. In the 1920s and early 1930s, it was
common for employers to dismiss all those out on strike and to hire
replacements.7 ° This effectively crushed the union organizing attempt and
the replacement workers were on notice of what would happen if they
should organize. This employer response was so common and so
destructive of union organization and collective bargaining that one would
think Congress would have addressed it in the debate on the Wagner Act, if
not in the statute itself, but it did not. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision
in NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.7" is not unexpected. The
Court rejected the argument that section 13 of the statute, which states that
nothing in the Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
72diminish in any way the right to strike, and restrained the employer from
replacing strikers. 3 The Court took the view that it simply did not follow
that an employer who had violated no provision of the Act somehow had
lost "the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers. 74 While the holding in Mackay Radio can be argued to
follow from Congress's silence on common employer response to a strike,
what is more surprising is the lack of any significant outcry75 against
Mackay Radio. As one commentator has pointed out: "The employer right
permanently to replace economic strikers ... obviously deters the exercise
FROM NEW ENGLAND TO THE SOUTH, 1880-1930 (1985). For a book that examines this
phenomenon by focusing on one company, see LAURENCE GROSS, COURSE OF INDUSTRIAL
DECLINE: THE BooTT MILLS OF LOWELL, MASSACHUSETrS, 1835-1955 (1993).
70. Factories tended to be smaller, and thus perhaps only 100-200 unskilled workers
might have to be replaced. In the large cities of the North and Midwest, there was a sizable
pool of available labor, often recent immigrants, that usually could be tapped to supply
replacement workers.
71. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
72. Id. at 344-345.
73. Id. at 345-346.
74. Id. at 345. This is one of the earliest post-Wagner Act examples of how the
Supreme Court would rely on a general notion of the extent of private property rights, with
no citation to any case or other authority, to defeat an important union organizing interest.
Over the years, the Court has seemed incapable of balancing private property rights against
general notions of employee rights. Rather, there must be a specific statutory provision or a
specific precedent that can be used before overriding a general property right. See James A.
Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations Law: A Violation of
the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYMENT POLICY J. 65
(1999).
75. For nearly thirty years, workers replaced in an economic strike had no right to
preferential reinstatement status when jobs opened up. The lack of protest against the dire
penalty they paid for exercising a statutory right is especially surprising. In 1976, the
Supreme Court held that the right to reinstate striking workers continues until those workers
have found other similar employment. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375
(1967).
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of the right to strike and is a severe sanction therefor. 76
Compared to the 1930s, markets are vastly different today. In the
1930s nearly all manufactured goods were made for a domestic market,
imports were limited for the most part to raw materials rather than finished
goods, and American employers were competing only with other domestic
employers for sales. American unions have known for several years that
they cannot raise wages in one location if the employer's products have to
compete with goods made in another region where wages are significantly
lower.77 This realization led directly to the formation of national unions.78
In industries with high union density, such as automobiles and steel, unions
were able to maintain high standards until the 1970s. 79  Thereafter
increasing importation of manufactured goods put pressure on companies
80to cut costs, and labor costs were an obvious target for savings.
Regardless of unionization, American wage levels were still higher than in
many parts of the world, which is why in the 1970s and 1980s companies
began in large numbers to move manufacturing plants abroad." These two
76. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 342 (1976).
77. The oft-quoted saying is: "A union must organize the length and breadth of the
market." See GORDON F. BLOOM AND HERBERT R. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR
RELATIONS 42 (9th ed. 1981). The pioneering work in labor economics was done by John
R. Commons and others at the University of Wisconsin in the early 1900s. See, e.g., TRADE
UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS (John R. Commons ed., 1921).
78. See REES, supra note 68, at 6: "In part, national unions arose in response to the
problem of competition in product markets as goods made in low-wage areas were sold in
the same markets as those made by local unions that had won higher wage scales."
Professor Rees comments that the development of national unions in the 1850s was related
to the improvements in transportation (the railroad) and in communications (the telegraph)
that made it technically and economically feasible to ship goods produced in one part of the
country to markets in another part. For a detailed study, see LLOYD ULMAN, THE RISE OF
THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION (1955).
79. See, e.g., Harry C. Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S.
Automobile Industry (1985); John P. Hoerr, And the Wolf Finally Came: The Decline of the
American Steel Industry (1988).
80. For a discussion of various forces compelling employers to restructure their
employment arrangements, see PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK 69-112 (1999).
Professor Cappelli notes that despite the fact that the changes accompanying this
restructuring appear to make employees substantially worse off, at least in the short run,
resistance by employees has been virtually nonexistent. He comments: "One reason is that
the ability of unions to counter management efforts to change practices declined sharply in
the 1980s." Id. at 110. He observes that many unionized firms were so weak that workers
had little choice but to acquiesce or see the firm shut down. See also Michael J. Piore, The
Future of Unions, in GEORGE STRAUSS, DANIEL G. GALLAGHER & JACK FIORITO, eds., THE
STATE OF THE UNIONS 387 - 410 (1991). Piore states: "Union wages, which previously had
been viewed as sustaining domestic demand, came now to be seen as handicapping
American industry in its competition with foreign producers for national (and international)
markets." Id. at 393.
81. Id. Cappelli notes that management's ability to move jobs away "seriously
weakened union power and forced unions to accept concessions."
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decades witnessed a significant deindustrialization of America.12  While
83this may have been good for America, it meant that fewer workers were
employed in jobs where striking is useful.84 It also meant that pattern
bargaining, a strategy used by many large unions in the mass-
manufacturing industry, became less successful. 85  This was because
companies were able to be less generous in their agreements, and could rest
86assured that their competitors would do the same.
Compared to the 1930s, the technological environment is vastly
differently today. In many industries, it is possible for a company to
82. The main reason for this is that because the American standard of living was higher
than that in the rapidly industrializing countries of Asia, U.S. hourly wage rates were higher
than those in Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and Singapore. Goods manufactured
abroad could come into the United States, be competitive on price if not on quality. In
contrast, until recently workers in service industries were mostly insulated from competition
with foreign workers, To put it succinctly, a bus may be made in Asia but the bus driver has
to live locally. A paper delivered in 1983 correctly forecast the impact of globalization on
American workers. See Lee Price, Growing Problems for American Workers in
International Trade, in THOMAS A. KOCHAN, ed., CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING
AMERICAN LABOR 125-147 (1985). See also Robert Z. Lawrence, Is Trade
Deindustrializing America? A Medium Term Perspective, in I BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1983).
83. This author does believe that this period of deindustrialization was necessary as part
of the transition to an information economy. In the long term, this will bring benefits to all.
In the short term, those laid off at closed plants often suffered as social safety nets. Though
they hoped for only temporary periods of unemployment, many of those laid off had
inadequate educational attainment for remaining jobs that paid as well as the job they lost.
84. Michael Gottesman, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized
Workers, 69 CH. KENT. L. REv. 59, 63 (1993) ("The last thing the worker frightened for
survival of the firm wants is to engage in 'economic warfare' that will cripple the
employer's ability to compete.") (citation omitted).
85. See Harry C. Katz & Thomas A. Kochan, An Introduction to Collective Bargaining
and Industrial Relations 194- 197 (1992); see also Audrey Freeman & William Fulmer, Last
Rites for Pattern Bargaining, 60 Harv. Bus. Rev. 30 (1982).
86. See William Gould, Introductory Comment: Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the
National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN.
L. REv. 937, 937 (1986). Although true multi-employer bargaining has never been common,
pattern bargaining has. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 722 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring in the result
and dissenting from the opinion) ("Terms and conditions of employment in a given
industry ... are often secured... through bargaining with market leaders that sets a
'pattern' for agreements on labor standards with other employers."). Pattern bargaining was
used in industries dominated by a few large companies and one union. Id. Typically, the
union would choose one company as the target in a given bargaining round. Id. Once the
union had settled with that company, it would turn to the other companies in the industry
and seek to apply the pattern to them. Id. Usually, the other companies quickly agreed to
nearly identical increases. Pattern bargaining was common in autos, steel, rubber, paper,
chemicals and oil. This broke down in the 1970s as companies facing foreign competition
sought to contain labor costs. As a result, labor relations in many companies, which had
been stable for over twenty-five years, became more acrimonious as companies sought to
escape the cost burden of being unionized.
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operate during strikes. 7 As a result, workers are aware that if they go on
strike, it may be a very long strike. Not surprisingly, therefore, unionized
8manufacturing workers display a reduced proclivity for striking.
Similarly, some service industry workers are also aware that if they were to
go on strike, there would be minimal impact on the employer. 89 Although
these perceptions are often not tested, they are very important because they
explain the disinclination of many persons to vote for a union. Employers
know what employers will tell them during an organizing campaign: that
the union cannot get anything more from the employer than the employer is
willing to give; and, that the union's only weapon is to go on strike (even
then the employer would not give concessions that would make the
company unprofitable). Employers often do not need to discuss the
possible adverse effects of a strike, such as being replaced, with the
workers. Workers can do a rough calculation and conclude that the cost of
joining a union may well outweigh the benefits.
A statute, which at its core relies on bargaining power and the strike
weapon, hits a discordant note today.90 Compared to the 1930s, the
industrial relations environment is vastly different. Even more importantly,
today's average worker is significantly different than his or her 1930s
counterpart. The average worker today is much better educated, works in a
service industry job, lives in suburbia, and thinks of himself or herself as
middle class.9' They tend to eschew angry, adversarial modes of
expression. They want a middle class lifestyle, and they deeply fear losing
it. These average workers of today probably would not use the word
"worker" to describe themselves, for it conjures up a blue collar or lower
class image. Rather, they see themselves as "employees." They want to
identify with their employer, and will become frustrated and disillusioned if
they perceive that their employer treats them as replaceable items. Human
resource management approaches of the last thirty years have also greatly
reduced the "us vs. them" organization of the workplace.92 There is often
87. See CHARLES R. PERRY, ANDREW M. KRAMER & THOMAS J. SCHNEIDER, OPERATING
DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATIONS (1982).
88. Peter Sherer, Reflections on Employee Voice and Representation for the Future, 69
CHI. KENT. L. REv. 249, 251 (1986) ("Competition has also had an effect on employee
attitudes about [union representation] .... [M]any employees have become more
concerned about their firm's competitive position. These employees do not want to lose
good jobs because they are hard to come by.") (citations omitted).
89. See id. at 252.
90. See Janice R. Bellace, Labor Law for the Post-Industrial Workplace: Breaking the
New Deal Model in the USA, in LABOUR LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 11-25, 18-22. (JR. Bellace & M.G. Rood eds., 1997).
91. This is not to deny that there are millions of low paid workers who live in cities, but
these are not the vast "middle" of the labor force.
92. Labor historian David Brody posits that over the last century, employers' methods
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no longer a sharp cleavage between workers and supervisors. 93 Workers of
different levels are members of the same team. 94 Non-supervisory workers
often do not work under direct supervision.95 Workers are empowered to
organize how they do their own work.96 In fact, while today's employees
do not like to view themselves as "workers," even their employers may
refer to them as "associates" rather than "employees." All of these factors
combine to make many of today's workers, even those who have strike
power, reject the idea of striking.
THE EMPLOYEE VOICE STRAIT JACKET
Because of the changes in the mindset of the average worker, the
appeal of traditional unionism does not resonate with them. They may not
be against unions and, in fact, may agree that some people still need
unions, but they do not see unions as something they would join.97 This is
for organizing production and their human management resource orientation have led to a
response from labor. At points of major changes, existing labor organizations have found it
difficult to respond. See David Brody, Labor Crisis in Perspective, in THE STATE OF THE
UNIONS 277-311 (George Strauss, Daniel G. Gallagher & Jack Fiorito eds., 1991). Brody
believes that "postindustrial technology demands involvement and commitment from
employees," and that as a result, management has changed its human resource management
orientation to one of less adversarialism and more cooperation. Id. at 309. Brody quotes a
statement of the Economic Policy Council that a "'them and us' system of workplace
relations [is] simply inadequate in today's social and economic environment." Id. at 309-
310.
93. Piore notes that in the 1980s, the "clear demarcation between workers and managers
was compromised through quality circles and worker representation on management teams,
even on company boards of directors." See Piore, supra note 80, at 394.
94. See EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMAY BATr, THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE:
TRANSFORMING WORK SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). In discussing American
models of high performance, they detail distinctive aspects of the American form of team
production. Id. at 135-139.
95. Appelbaum and Batt, id., studied a number of companies utilizing self-directed
work teams. They note that the basic production unit is a team or collaborative work group,
and commented that "the key is that front-line employees participate fully in shaping their
areas of responsibility." Id. at 137. One of the most notable examples is Saturn
Corporation, where the "integration of technical and social work organization is an
organizing principle ... that extends to the electronic data systems which track information
on everything from human resources and the flow of materials to financial data,
manufacturing, product engineering, marketing and service." Id.
96. See, e.g., TRANSFORMING ORGANIZATIONS (Thomas A. Kochan & Michael Useem
eds., 1992).
97. See ADAMS, supra note 67, at 44-46. Professor Adams points out that the AFL
philosophy, which was accepting of capitalism, cast unionism as something workers might
elect when it benefited them in their specific job. Since Americans are taught that they are
all political and social equals, but also that they should strive to improve their individual
economic position, they are inclined to view belonging to unions as legitimate depending on
an individual's need. Id. at 44-46. It is interesting to note that the sector that enjoyed great
gains during the 1990s, finance, insurance and real estate, are the sectors with the lowest
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particularly likely when they perceive that their own employer is opposed
to unions. 98 This does not mean, however, that today's workers are not
interested in any form of employee representation. Surveys show that there
is significant interest in having a voice at work.99 It is clear that there are
many more workers who want unions than workers who are actually
members of unions.'0° But the numbers do not necessarily mean that there
is fertile organizing territory for unions, since latent union supporters are
likely to be spread out among workplaces and, therefore, constitute a
minority in any given workplace. Since current law requires that the union
receive the support of a majority of workers in an appropriate unit,' °1 even
the most vigorous of organizing efforts is not likely to capture many of• • 102
these persons expressing an interest in unionism. Moreover, even those
expressing an interest in unions might quickly be swayed otherwise once a
union organizing campaign began and the employer responded. 1
03
The dilemma facing many American workers is simple. They would
unionization rate for private sector workers. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION
MEMBERS IN 2000 (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
Only 1.6% of employees in this growing sector of the economy are unionized. See id.
98. This acute sensitivity to the employer's stance on unionism explains why it is easier
for unions to organize public sector workers. Often public sector employers feel politically
constrained when responding to a union organizing campaign and exhibit a neutral stance on
the outcome. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 97, at 1. This is rare in
the private sector. See id. Data for the year 2000 reveal that only 9.0% of private sector
workers are union members compared to 37.5% of government workers. Id.
99. See Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee
Representation in a Nonunion Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13-79 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993). Using two
large surveys, the authors calculate the unmet desire for representation at 30-40 million
employees. Id. at 28-38. Freeman and Rogers, in continuing to do research in this area,
specifically looked at whether employees not interested in adversarial bargaining were
interested in having a say at workplace level. Eight-eight percent of those surveyed
indicated that they did want representation on issues such as the making of rules at work.
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, supra note 60, at 60-61.
100. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 60, at 69. The authors estimate that the
number of workers who want unions is twice as many as are currently members of unions.
Id.
101. See Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a
"Unique" American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 47, 60 (1998) (discussing
union representation of individuals who are not members of the majority union).
102. Some would argue that surveys such as the Gallup poll and Fingerhut survey used
by Freeman and Rogers over-estimate the number of persons interested in unions because
respondents are expressing casual desires rather than a considered cost-benefit analysis.
Professor Leo Troy states that if respondents were asked to calculate the cost of union
membership (dues, lost wages due to strikes, etc.), the result would be much different. LEO
TROY, BEYOND UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 150 (1999).
103. See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1776-81 (1983) (discussing
employer tactics in organizing campaigns).
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like more employee voice at work, but the only option presented to them,
traditional unionism wedded to adversarial bargaining, does not appeal to
them. One striking facet of contemporary American labor relations is that
there is only one mode of employee voice sanctioned. There is a mismatch
between what employees indicate they want and what is offered. At
present, aside from utilizing elected employee representatives, the only
form of employee voice on terms and conditions of employment is the
traditional labor organization contemplated by the Wagner Act.
This is in contrast to most European countries, where dual channels of
employee voice are in place.'04 Although the structures and exact
delineation vary by country, the general pattern is that unions represent
workers for the purpose of bargaining on wages and hours, and works
councils represent workers for the purpose of receiving information and
being consulted on issues relevant to the workplace.1°5 In all countries,
unions are voluntary organizations, and bargaining can best be described as
adversarial. 10 6 In almost no European country do members elect union
officers in some process supervised by the state. Rather, members in a
voluntary organization are assumed to set their own procedures for the
governance of the organization. 0 7 In most European countries, some body
akin to a works council exists by virtue of legislation.' ° It varies whether a
company must have a works council, or whether employees must request
it.'0 9 In nearly all continental European countries, the procedures for
electing the worker representatives for the works council are stipulated by
104. This dual channel mode occurs in practice in Japan, but takes place under the
auspices of the union. Janice R. Bellace, The Role of the Law in Supporting Cooperative
Employee Representation Systems, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 441 (1994). Joint consultation
committees provide the forum for the cooperative, consultation arm of the company union.
Kazuo Sugeno, Japan: The State's Guiding Role in Socioeconomic Development, 14 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 302 (1993). See also Takashi Araki, The Japanese Model of Employee
Representational Participation, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 143 (1994). The adversarial, bargaining
arm of the company union is exhibited usually in conjunction with a spring wage offensive
mounted by the unions' industry federation. See TADASHI HANAMI, LABOR RELATIONS IN
JAPAN TODAY 94-101 (1979).
105. See Marco Biagi, Forms of Employee Representational Participation, in
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET
ECONOMIES 315-345 (Roger Blanpain & Christopher Engels eds., 5th ed. 1993).
106. See Gian Primo Cella & Tiziano Treu, National Trade Union Movements, in
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET
ECONOMIES 281-314 (Roger Blanpain & Christopher Engels eds., 5th ed. 1993).
107. Id.
108. Paul Davies, The Representation of Workers in the United Kingdom From
Collective Laissez-Faire to Market Individualism, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 167, 170 (1994). The
United Kingdom is the leading example of a large country with no works councils mandated
by statute. See id.
109. See generally EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS (Roger Blanpain & Tadashi Hanami
eds., 1995).
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law. ° The works council is not only seen as a forum for dealing with
workplace issues, it is also seen as a body whose members should work in a
cooperative mode.1 '
During the past twenty years, European countries have also witnessed
some degree of deindustrialization, with the consequent shift in the labor
force to services.' 12 To some extent, this has had a negative impact on
unions, although to a much smaller degree than in the United States.'13 In
contrast, works councils have not only remained firmly in place but have
expanded in influence.
1 14
This has occurred because the cooperative, modus operandi of works
councils appeals to today's service and knowledge-based workers. The
appeal flows from several factors. First, works councils are not adversarial,
and the more educated worker more favorably views a process that relies
on information-sharing, discussion, and exploration of options. Second, the
110. Id. Frequently, legislation exempts small enterprises from the requirement of a
works council. See Marco Biagi, Employee Representation in Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises: A Comparative Overview, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 257 (1992), for a review of the
legislation in European countries. In a few countries, a works council type body exists, but
there is no legislation governing how its members are selected. Italy is a prime example of
this. See Marco Biagi, Employee Representational Participation in Italy, 15 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 155 (1994).
111. In some European countries, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, there is no legal
distinction between adversarial collective bargaining and non-adversarial consultation. See
Marco Biagi, Employee Representational Participation in Italy, 15 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 155,
163 (1994); Davies, supra note 108, at 169. In some countries, however, such as Germany,
a works council may operate under legislation known as a "peace obligation" that precludes
a strike in support of a works council position but allows a strike in support of a union
position. See Rudolf Buschmann, Workers Participation and Collective Bargaining in
Germany, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 26, 29 (1993).
112. See Charles Feinstein, Structural Changes in the Developed Countries during the
Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD REV. EcON. POLICY 35 (1999).
113. The main explanation for this relates to the level of bargaining. In most European
countries, bargaining occurs on an industry-wide basis, by region or nationally. All
employers are in the same employers' federation and will sign one agreement with the
union. The agreement by necessity covers only the major terms on wages and hours. It is
often called a "framework" agreement as it is understood that company and plant specific
terms will be filled in later, by a local round of bargaining or by the works council. Thus,
there was much less pressure on any one employer to de-unionize. All employers were
under pressure to achieve a more reasonable agreement with the union. In contrast, in the
United States where most bargaining occurs at company or even lower level, each individual
company sought to lower its labor costs by demanding concessions from its union, or by
escaping unionism. See generally ORGANIZED INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE: WHAT
FUTURE? (Colin Crouch & Franz Traxler eds., 1995); TRADE UNIONS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (Wolfgang Lechner ed., 1994).
114. To some extent, traditional works councils (located at the workplace and enterprise
level) have assumed greater importance because they feed up into the new European level
works council mandated by a European Union directive. See Thorsten Schulten, European
Works Councils: Prospects for A New System of European Industrial Relations, 2 EUR. J.
INDUS. REL. 303 (1996).
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issues before the works council are for the most part confined to the
workplace." 5 These are issues that the workers know well and can
understand. They are also of a type that are often susceptible to win-win
solutions. Third, because these occur at the level of the facility, those
represented actually know the co-workers speaking for them, and they
know those who speak for management. This personal knowledge
invariably creates more interest in the works council's deliberations, and it
often creates more trust in it. Fourth, workers do not have to take any bold
action to form a works council, nor does their desire for a works council
signal any disloyalty to the employer. All these factors contribute to an
overall picture where works councils are non-controversial forums, a venue
for the discussion of workplace issues.
The continuing interest in works councils may stem from the fact that
a works council becomes the vehicle for something that more educated
employees want: information about the employer's plans. Today's
employees are aware that their jobs may be threatened because the
employer may be doing badly, planning to introduce new technology, or
planning to change the products made or the services sold. More educated
employees want information, and they want to be able to influence
decisions that will affect them. It may be this need that has caused
widespread political support for the extension of works councils. In
Europe, works councils were originally plant-based, but they are now used
as the basis for higher level consultation and information disclosure,
extending up to the level of the European Union.
1 16
In Europe, since 1974, there has been a movement to use European
Union mechanisms to ensure that workers are informed and consulted
about events that concern them." 7  This coincides with the European
Commission's view that in the creation of an internal market, the affairs of
companies should become more transparent so that governments, investors
and workers have the relevant information upon which to base important
decisions."l8  The European Commission has directed that workers'
information and consultation rights should extend beyond the terms and
conditions of employment to information concerning the state of the
company, the introduction of new technology, and the market for the
115. See generally Workers' Participation: Influence on Management Decision-Making
by Labour in the Private Sector, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, No. 23 (Roger
Blanpain ed., 1992).
116. See Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive: Transnational
Information and Consultation in the European Union, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 325, 349 (1997)
(describing purpose of directive on the establishment of a European Works Council or a
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings).
117. Id. at 339.
118. Id. at 340-49.
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company's products and services." 9 This is in sharp contrast to the view
on the rights of American workers to information. Although the Wagner
Act made no mention of worker rights to information, the courts quickly
recognized that it would be impossible for unions to bargain if they lacked
necessary information on the terms and conditions of employment. 120 From
its earliest origins, the duty to disclose has always been viewed as a
derivative right, linked to the duty to bargain in good faith. 12' This linkage,
rather than extending the scope of disclosure over the years, has served to
limit the extension of the disclosure obligation. This has come about as a
result of NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,122 where the
Supreme Court considered the universe of possible subjects of bargaining
and separated subjects into three categories: mandatory, permissive and
illegal. 123  The employer's duty to disclose relevant and necessary
information remained linked to mandatory subjects of bargaining. Not only
do employees' have no right to bargain over permissive subjects, but
employees do not even have the right to be informed of, let alone consulted
about, important events. Any decision that declares a subject is permissive
has ramifications for the information rights of employees, rights that are
not even mentioned by the Supreme Court. 24 Nowhere in the decision did
the Court indicate why employees should not be informed that their
employment would cease suddenly in a short time. Information disclosure
was not mentioned at all.
How American labor law came to reach the point where unionized
employees lack the right to receive relevant information about their
imminent employment status can best be explained by blind adherence to
the rigid model of adversarial bargaining that underlies the Wagner Act.
25
Put in the most basic language, employers do not have to tell employees
anything unless required to do so by law, and all the Wagner Act requires is
that employers disclose information relevant and necessary to bargaining.
126
119. Id.
120. See S.L. Allen & Co., Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 728 (1936), enforced, 2 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 780 (3d Cir. 1938) (demonstrating employer resistance to provide any information
on what the company was paying its workers).
121. For a discussion, see Janice R. Bellace & Howard F. Gospel, Disclosure of
Information to Trade Unions: A Comparative Perspective, 122 INT'L LABOUR REV. 57
(1983).
122. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
123. Id. at 348-49.
124. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981) (providing
many reasons why the employer would be burdened if it had to bargain with the union over
its plan to discontinue the contract for the services of these janitorial employees).
125. See Janice R. Bellace, Mandatory Consultation: The Untravelled Road in American
Labor Law, 40 INDUs. RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N. PROC. 79-83 (1987) (arguing that the duty
to bargain often times actually serves to constrain the collective bargaining process).
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 158.
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This view of information disclosure seems out of step with a broader
trend in society that advocates the free flow of information because it
results in better decisions. What is surprising in America is that there has
been no movement to give all workers information rights. Compare this
with the efforts since the 1930s to give shareholders increasing rights to
information on the grounds that markets work best when buyers and sellers
have symmetric information. Yet there has been no corresponding call that
employees, as stakeholders of the company and as investors of their human
capital, should have information necessary to optimize their position in the
labor market.
While the Wagner Act may still remain valuable in meeting the need
to fend off common law restraints on union organizing and bargaining, it
has become a strait jacket. Those seeking other forms of employee
representational participation are told it is unlawful, 12 and employees are
left with no alternatives to adversarial bargaining.
EMPLOYEE VOICE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
The transition in America, from an industrial economy to what some
call the post-industrial era or information age, demands new forms of
employee representation. The model of representation appropriate for
1930s America, focusing on an industrial economy, a domestic market,
industrial workers, and a model embraced by the Wagner Act, is no longer
appropriate. This is not to say it is obsolete, but the challenge for anyone
proposing a new model is to consider how the existing model can be
sustained alongside something new. Some workers may want to engage
127. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992), enforced, 35 F.2d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994). See also Janice R. Bellace, Electromation: The Dilemma of Employee
Participation Under the NLRA, 45 N.Y. UNIV. ANNUAL NAT'L CONFERENCE ON LABOR 225-
44 (Bruno Stein ed., 1993).
128. Beginning in the 1920s, some companies sponsored what were called "employee
representation plans" which provided employees with a way of expressing their voice in the
workplace. While some companies may have had benevolent motives for so doing, others
utilized employee representation plans as a way of forestalling the development of
independent union organizations. See Daniel Nelson, Employee Representation in Historical
Perspective, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 371-
390 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993). Derided as "company unions" by
the AFL, such company-based employee organizations were seen as moderate, and were
definitely not independent. The number of companies sponsoring employee representation
plans sharply increased after the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, as
employers sought to comply with section 7(a) of the NIRA as part of meeting the conditions
for displaying the Blue Eagle. At the time, it was estimated that 70% of employer-
sponsored unions had sprung up after the enactment of section 7(a). Report of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, S. REP. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at 9-11 (1934). The
experience under the National Labor Board in 1934, when independent unions were found
to be at a substantial disadvantage in trying to organize workers at a plant where a company
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in traditional collective bargaining and it may work well in many current
employment situations. Many persons who support unions fear that an
employee consultative forum will undermine the support of unions, and
thus they oppose the consultative committee idea. This fear is not
groundless. 129
At this point, it is helpful to re-cast the original question posed at the
beginning of this article. It is not the future of unions in the twenty-first
century that should concern us but the future of employee representation.
What is critical is the core value underlying the Wagner Act; namely,
freedom of association. Section 7 states this eloquently when it says that
workers shall have the right to form, join and assist organizations of their
own choosing.13 ° What is needed today is government support of this core
value that is essential to democracy. Lacking in America is a realization
that there are fundamental human rights that must be permitted to exist at
the workplace or else our claim of freedom and democracy rings hollow.'
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There is already an international consensus on fundamental human
workplace rights. Since 1994, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
has also sought to raise public consciousness regarding four core rights,
emanating from fundamental human rights.' 3 2 These four core rights are
not merely labor standards as might be found in a fair labor standards
statute. The ILO has stressed that these rights are not "worker rights" but
union existed, precipitated the inclusion of the ban on company unions in section 8(a)(2) in
the Wagner Act. This bitter experience with company-based employee representation plans
may explain American organized labor's hostility to the notion of establishing a procedure
for consultative committees. For a discussion of company unions as an anti-union employer
tactic, see BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WTNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 128-129 (5th ed.
1987).
129. See Janice R. Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, 17 INT'L J. OF COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 269 (2001).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 151
13 1. See, e.g., Janice R. Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, 17 INT'L J. OF COMP. LAB.L. & INDUS. REL. 269 (2001); Michael H.
Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, in
THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 57-94 (Matthew Finkin ed., 1994);
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 136-49 (1993); Paul C. Weiler, A Principled
Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177,
197-200 (2001).
132. For a discussion of how the ILO views the distinction, and how it applies it to
specific conventions, see Hector G. Bartolomei de la Cruz, Gerhard von Potobsky & Lee
Swepston, The International Labor Organization: The International Standards System and
Basic Human Rights (1996). See also Nicholas Valticos, International Labour Standards
and Human Rights: Approaching the Year 2000, 137 Int'l Lab. Rev. 135 (1998).
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"rights at work."'133 That is, they are rights that all persons possess by
virtue of being human, but they are human rights with particular
applicability at work. Paragraph 2 of the ILO 1998 Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work sets out four rights: (1)
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining, (2) the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labor, (3) the effective abolition of child labor, and (4) the
elimination of employment and occupation discrimination.' 4  A fuller
understanding of the meaning of these four rights comes from the eight
core ILO conventions underlying them.
135
Of these conventions, the one that most directly relates to employee
voice is Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association. 36 The origins of the
notion of freedom of association as applied to a workplace setting can be
traced to the 1800s, as a philosophical outcry against the suppression of
workers' organizations. 137 The notion of freedom of association became
133. For a discussion of what constitutes "international human rights," see Sarah H.
Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE L.J. 1 (2001).
Some United Nations conventions cover a topic, such as rights of the child, in the broadest
fashion including rights to education and health care, whereas the ILO is concerned with
how the child's rights can be infringed in the employment sphere. Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). For a
discussion of the concept of fundamental human rights in the ILO, see BARTOLOMEI DE LA
CRUZ, supra note 132, at 127-129.
134. INT'L LABOUR ORG., DECLARATION OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT
WORK (1998), available at
http://www.itcilo.itlenglishlactrav/telearn/globallilollaw/idec.htm. See generally Janice R.
Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 17 INT'L J.
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 269 (2001) (discussing this Declaration, its content, and
follow-up).
135. Convention No. 87, Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise, 1948, in 1 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS 527-32, (1996); Convention No. 98, Convention Concerning the
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1948, in 1
INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 639-43 (1994);
Convention No. 29, Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930, in 1
INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 143-53 (1994);
Convention No. 105, Convention Concerning Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957, in I INT'L
LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 88-90 (1994);
Convention No. 138, Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,
1973, in 2 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 525-32
(1994); Convention No. 100, Equal Remuneration for Men and Women workers for Work
of Equal Value, 1951, in 1 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS 649-52 (1994); Convention No. 111, Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation, 1958, in 2 INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L LABOUR CONVENTIONS
& RECOMMENDATIONS 176-79 (1994); Convention No. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention, 1999, available at http://shr.aaas.org/thesaurus/instrument.php?insid= 136.
136. H. Dunning, The Origins of Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and the
Right to Organize, 137 INT'L LAB. REV. 149 (1998).
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internationally accepted as a lynchpin of democracy at the end of World
War 1. ' Part XIII of the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty ending World War I
not only created the ILO, but it also listed principles of special and urgent
importance, including freedom of association.13 9 The 1944 Declaration of
Philadelphia, adopted by the International Labour Conference in the midst
of the world war against fascism, when free trade unions in many countries
had been ruthlessly suppressed, strongly emphasized the right of freedom
of association and the effective recognition of the right of collective
bargaining. The ILO's attention to these specific matters was hastened by
political developments of the immediate post-war period as the Iron
Curtain was falling. Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and the
Right to Organise, was adopted by the International Labour Conference in
1948. The integrally related convention, Convention No. 98, Right of
Collective Bargaining, was adopted in 1949. 14 In this same time period,
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted.
Article 20 of the 1948 United Nations Declaration declares that everyone
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and article
23 states that everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
Although Convention No. 87 has 141 ratifications, the United States
has never ratified it.14' Admittedly the United States has ratified few
conventions, but often one can say that the United States would meet the
standards laid down by a convention and could ratify that convention if it
chose to do so. 42 This is not the case with Convention No. 87 because
current American law permits major gaps in protection to exist. 43 The
most prominent gaps relate to exclusions from protections. For instance,
Convention No. 87 states that all workers have the right to join
organizations of their own choosing, and 'workers' is defined broadly to
Shotwell ed., 1934).
138. See Bartolomei de la Cruz, supra note 132, at 4-5. See also Jill Murray,
Transnational Labour Regulation: The ILO and EC Compared 35-40 (2001).
139. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, International Labour
Conference, 81st Sess. (1994), Report III (Part 4B) ("General Survey" for 1994).
140. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(AIII), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
141. Convention No. 87 has been ratified by 141 countries as of Sept. 13, 2002. The list
of ratifications may be found at the ILO website,
http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/convdispl.htm. The United States is not listed as having
ratified this Convention.
142. See, e.g., Convention No. 111, Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, 1958, supra note 135, at 176-79.
143. See, e.g., Lance Compa, Workers' Freedom of Association in the United States
under International Human Rights Standards, 17 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL.
289, 308 (2001).
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
include nearly all employees.' 44 In contrast, the Wagner Act's definition of
employee excludes substantial portions of the civilian labor force.
Convention No. 87 and the inextricably related Convention No. 98 protect




EMBODYING FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN A NEW MODEL
The starting point for any proposal for a new form of employee
representation is that it should apply the internationally accepted notion of
freedom of association. Whatever the parameters of the model, its
hallmark should be the independence of employee voice.146 All employees
should be covered by the statute that gives legal support to the new model
of employee representation. The new law should recognize that employees
have the right to form, join and assist organizations of their own choosing.
It should guarantee that that they have the right to fashion these
organizations. In addition, the new law should be suited to assist them in
their goal of expressing their views at the workplace for the purpose of
improving their terms and conditions of employment and of their own
employability. The expression of views should be bolstered by ensuring
the employees are in receipt of relevant information, and thus information
disclosure by employers should be required by law. The employees should
be free to decide whether this expression of views occurs through
adversarial collective bargaining, consultation, or some other mode.
To achieve this, a new statute is necessary. The Wagner Act does not
have a sufficiently strong foundation upon which to build new structures
that will transform existing concepts of employee representation. In
addition, because such a statute would exist against a backdrop of sixty-
five years of case law not hospitable to a profoundly robust view of
employee rights, there must be a strong legislative statement to the effect
that it is the policy of the United States to support freedom of association
and to ensure the application of this fundamental human right at work.
There will only be a future for employee representation, and for unions, in
the twenty-first century if there is widespread acceptance that freedom of
144. Convention No. 87, Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise, 1948, supra note 135, at 527-28.
145. The only exceptions are for those public servants engaged in the administration of
the state. See GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 139, at 24-28, for a discussion of the view of
the Committee of Experts on the ability of the state to limit the rights of public servants to
bargain collectively and/or to strike.
146. Professor Clyde Summers makes this point eloquently and lists the aspects of the
principle that must be incorporated into any new statutory scheme. See Clyde W. Summers,
Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(A)(2), in THE
LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 126 (Matthew W. Finkin ed., 1994).
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association is the bedrock of democracy, and that it is a principle that must
be operative at work.
